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Abstract
 This study explores the flypaper effect in Indonesia using a spatial 
approach. Covering data from 2000-2014, the paper shows that grants stimulate 
overspending by local governments even though spatial interdependence 
is carefully treated. The elasticity of lump-sum grants to expenditure 
is stronger than the elasticity of matching grants. Further, elasticity of 
lump-sum grant is greater on routine expenditure, which shows the over-
dependency of local governments to lump-sum grant. The over - dependency 
phenomenon has not changed a lot even after a major changes of lump-sum 
grant formulation being applied by the 2004 decentralization law package.
Keywords: flypaper effect, intergovernmental transfer, local government ex-
penditure.
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I. Introduction 
 ‘The money seems to stick where it hits, like a flypaper‘ was a well-known 
remark by Arthur Okun that was cited in Inman (2008) where per-dollar non-
matching grants stimulate government expenditure more than the income of the 
citizens does. The exogenous federal grant to a local government recipient increases 
public expenditure more than an equivalent increase in citizens’ income. Like a 
flypaper, the government grant stays in the hands of the government and the citizens’ 
income stays in the citizens hand.
 This study explores the flypaper effect in Indonesia. The flypaper effect is 
investigated by observing the marginal effect of federal grants to public expenditure 
and compare it with the marginal effect of household income. Using the case of 
decentralized Indonesia, the grant to local government is calculated by a central 
decision, which is independent to local government. This case would allow us to ensure 
that the grant is exogenous.1 This paper also specifies the spatial effect on estimating 
the size of the flypaper effect. Spatial effects matter to public expenditure. LeSage 
and Dominguez (2012) argue that a spillover of public goods creates bias of public 
expenditure in the sense that public service not only affects on the jurisdiction but also 
the nearest surrounding neighborhood/region. Furthermore, under open-bounded 
geography economic interaction among the surrounding neighboring regions should 
vary citizen income which causes omitted variables bias in conservative regression 
models. Therefore, spatial approach is necessary to determine the true magnitude 
of the flypaper effect, which is less-explored in previous literature on the subject.
 An initial study to estimate the influence of flypaper effect was conducted by 
Gramlich et al. (1973) who estimates per-dollar addition of federal grant increases 
43 cents of state government expenditure. Inman (2008) conducted a panel study 
of 41 city budgets and found a one-dollar increase of grant equivalently increase 
one-dollar of expenditure while companion income increased by 0.3 dollar. Other 
Tengku Munawar Chalil, Osaka University, Japan
1 Indonesia has three-types of grants to local government, namely: general allocation grant, specific allocation grant, 
and revenue sharing.  The first one has the closest characteristics to a lump-sum grant, the second is a matching 
grant, and the third is joint-ventures grant. General allocation grants accounted for the largest portion of total grants 
received by local government and it is purely calculated by a fixed formula as mandated on Law 33/2004 on fiscal 
transfer.
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studies have tried to revisit the concept of the flypaper effect. Conventional approach 
is to use the impact of the grant on total expenditure to observe the flypaper effect. 
Mattos, Rocha and Arvate (2011) argues that flypaper effect can be observed when 
a higher transfer from central government negatively affects the consumer’s income 
based on the efficiency of taxation. Strumpf (1998) noted that flypaper effect is 
marked by higher overhead spending as an effect that is created by lump-sum 
welfare grants. Bailey and Connolly (1998) remarked on the future research areas 
for flypaper effect literature. They noted that federal grants should be exogenous 
from local government decisions in order to estimate the true magnitude of flypaper 
effect. Further, the future flypaper effect research should incorporate the economic 
of exit and voice, dynamics element and comprehensive multi-disciplinary model.
 Kakamu, Yunoue and Kuramoto (2014) conducted a study exploring the 
spatial pattern of the flypaper effect. Using a combination of the Bayesian approach 
and a spatial model, they found that Local Allocation Tax (LAT) transfer causes a 
flypaper effect on education and land development spending in Japanese prefectures. 
Further spatial dependencies matter for the above-mentioned spending. This 
paper dives deeper into the analysis of municipal/city level.2 A spatial-maximum 
likelihood approach is employed to avoid overestimation of the flypaper effect.3 
This paper also decomposed government expenditure into overhead and capital 
spending and shows that a per-unit grant stimulates more on overhead spending. 
In addition, grants are decomposed into three-types: lump-sum grant, matching 
grant, and revenue shares.4 Interestingly, the stimulation effect of a lump-sum 
grant less than revenue shares on total budget. The lump-sum grant significantly 
stimulates overhead spending but not capital spending. In contrast, a matching 
grant stimulates capital spending but significantly negatively affects routine 
spending. Revenue sharing has a moderate effect and citizen income has the lowest 
effect on all types of government expenditure. In all specifications, spatial error 
is not rejected as having an effect in correlating expenditure, grant and income.
 Another issue that is explored in this paper is the matter of decentralization 
process in Indonesia towards fiscal illusion. Post the significant turbulence from 
centralization to decentralization in 1999, the relationship between central and 
2 Another honorable paper that needs to be mentioned is the study by Acosta (2010), in which he observed spatial the 
inter-dependency of the flypaper effect at county level at Buenos-Aires Province, Argentina.
3 Megdal (1987) showed a Monte-Carlo evidence that using least-square estimation leads to erroneous conclusions 
regarding the flypaper effect. She also shows that coefficients that are produced by likelihood estimators have the 
closest value to true coefficient.
4 Strumpf (1998) refers to that larger effect of grants on overhead spending as a flypaper effect. However, he did not 
include the types of grant into estimations.
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local government has shift ed twice, at 2004 and 2014.5 Th e shift  signifi cantly  changed 
the characteristics of grant which describes the magnitude of the fl y- paper eff ect over 
the two periods. In addition, the paper utilized geographically weighted regression 
as a tool to map the spatial pattern of the fl ypaper eff ect, which is not presented in 
previous studies.
 Th e paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the fl ypaper 
eff ect. Section 3 presents data description. Section 4 presents the spatial model 
on estimating the fl ypaper eff ect, including a general spatial nested model and 
geographically weighted regression. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and 
fi nally Section 6 concludes the study.
II. Basic Model: Concept of Flypaper Eff ect
 Th e economic theory of an intergovernmental grant was explained by Bradford 
and Oates (1971) and Wyckoff  (1990). If lump-sum grants are endowed to lower-tier 
governments, the per-capita share of lump-sum grants is equal to the increase of the 
median voter’s income, in this sense lump-sum grants only create an income eff ect.
Figure 1. Fiscal Illusion of Intergovernmental Transfer
 Figure 1 illustrates the lump-sum grant’s income eff ect. In this illustration, 
assume that the bureaucrats follow median voter’s preference. Before the grant is 
given, the median voter’s optimal choice is e1 with the following budget constraint:
m = P1X1 + P2X2
5 There are three laws marking the milestone of decentralization policy in Indonesia. Law 22/1999 for pioneering 
decentralization, Law 32/2004 for rebalancing the power of central and local government, and Law 23/2014 as the 
fi nal revision of decentralization policy. Since the recent law has not yet completed a derivative law package, this 
paper limits itself to dealing only with the pre- and post-Law 32/2004.
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 Where m is the median voter’s income, P1 and P2 are the tax-price to local 
public goods’ supply and price of private goods.  X1  and  X2  are the amount  of public and 
private goods. Endowed with a share of a lump-sum grant from central government, 
the income eff ect shift s the income into m’ where the new local government 
expenditure is e2. Th is is the condition only if bureaucrats follow the median 
voter’s preference. However, the self-interested bureaucrats hide intergovernmental 
grants and perceive the tax-price of public goods, which is characterized as follows:
P1j  = (G - Z)/G
 Where P1j is the perceived tax price, G and Z are the real public spending and 
lump-sum transfer. Th erefore, the median voter’s preference for local government 
expenditure shift  into e3. Th e voters accept the condition since they receive higher 
provision of public goods but are not aware of the amount of grant received. As a 
result, a lump-sum grant from central government stays with local government, 
which is known as the fl ypaper eff ect.
Several model specifi cations are employed to estimate the fl ypaper eff ect (see: 
Kakamu, Yunoue and Kuramoto, 2014; Gramlich et al., 1973; Strumpf, 1998; and 
Worthington and Dollery, 1999). Th e use of either linear or log - linear regression are 
acceptable. Th e linear reduced form on estimating the fl ypaper eff ect is expressed as 
follows:
Gi  =  α + β1zi + β2mi + εi  (1)
 Where Gi is public expenditure by municipal/city government i, zi is the 
transfer from central government, and mi is household income in the municipal/
city i jurisdiction area. εi is the error term.  Inman (2008) mentioned that if political 
representatives follow the citizens preference as follows:
in most case, otherwise we can expect the existence of the fl ypaper eff ect.
III. Data
 Th e dataset from the Indonesia Database for Economic Research 
(INDO-DAPOER) - Th e World Bank is utilized in this study. Th e data covers 
period 2000-2014 at municipal/city level but unbalance by several restraints. 
Variables that are employed and their summary statistics are described in Table 
1. Th e estimation employs several control variables such as regional GDP and 
shares of origin revenue as treatment for fi scal disparity bias at observation. Th e 
regional and provincial dummy variables are utilized to treat heterogeneities of 
Tengku Munawar Chalil
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local government characteristic’s bias such as language, culture, and customs.
Table 1. Statistics Summary
Variable Mean Pre-Desent Post-Desent Difference-
2000-2014 2000-2004 2005-2014 in-Mean
Household Income 172.22 93.43 222.31 -156.64
(-14.89)
Total Spending 533.76 254.15 661.46 -438.78
(-35.19)
Capital Spending 146.59 50.96 180.63 -133.87
(-12.90)
Overhead Spending 282.49 128.98 346.78 -240.93
(-35.33)
Total Grant 450.49 203.66 499.26 -314.13
(-41.39)
Equalization Grant 317.49 149.82 391.87 -255.55
(-40.58)
Specific Allocation Grant 33.24 9.28 42.83 -33.40
(-38.77)
Revenue Sharing 50.48 23.43 64.56 -47.70
(-6.11)
Notes: All variable values in Billion Rupiah; Student t-test values in brackets.
IV. Spatial Model for Flypaper Effect
 The general form for the spatial linear model is expressed as follows:
Y = σWY + αIN + Xβ + WXθ + µ
µ = λWµ + ε
 The above equation is also known as general nesting spatial model (Elhorst, 
2014), where W is non-negative spatial contiguity matrix, σ is the coefficient of 
spatial auto-regressive, λ is the coefficient of spatial auto-correlation, and β and θ 
are unknown parameters to be estimated. Modifying equation (1), the empirical 
equation of the flypaper effect is written as follows: 
Gi= σWGi+ αIN+β1 Zi+β2 mi+βk Xi+θWXi+μ
μ=λWμ+ε
4.1. Building the Spatial Weighting Matrix
 The spatial weighting matrix is a non-negative matrix W = (wij : i, j = 1, ..., 
n) that summarizes spatial relations between n spatial units. In practice, weighting is 
categorized by distance, boundaries, and mix-distance and boundaries. In this paper, 
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weighting based on boundaries is selected in particular the queen’s contiguity matrix. 
If a unit i shares a single boundary unit then it is considered as neighborhood, which 
is defi ned by:
 To remove the dependence of extraneous scale factors, Wij needs to be 
normalized with a sum equal to one, i.e.,
 Since the queen’s contiguity matrix contains binary values, its creation process 
is row-normalized with the sum to one. Th e creation of the weighting matrix using 
Indonesian data, GeoDa (Anselin, Syabri and Kho, 2006) is utilized. Th e archipelagic 
condition of Indonesia has resulted in 24 observations that are neighborless since it 
is surrounded by sea (none share a single boundary with neighborhood).
4.2. Spatial Lag Model (SLM)
 From a general nesting spatial model, when dependent variables are assumed 
to be exogenous i.e., θ = 0 and homogeneity is assured i.e., λ = 0 then the model can 
be expressed as follows:
Y  = σWY + αIN + Xβ + µ  (2)
 Th is model is known as spatial lag model. Th e approach on estimating this 
type of model is to use maximum likelihood estimation ((Anselin and Bera, 1998) 
and (Anselin, Syabri and Kho, 2006)).
4.3. Spatial Error Model (SEM)
 Spatial Error Model specifi es the spatial infl uences in residual terms and is 
exogenous of independent variables. Th e model is expressed as follows:
Y = αIN + Xβ + µ 
µ = λW µ + ε
or
Y = αIN + Xβ + (I − λW )-1ε  (3)
 Similar to spatial lag model, spatial error model is also estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation.
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4.4. Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR)
 Geographical weighted regression enables local variation in each observation. 
Th e weighting matrix of GWR contains geographical weights on diagonal elements 
and zero for off -diagonal. For ui and vi as Geographic XY-Coordinate, then:
 Th e weight wi(ui, vi) assigned to each observation is based on a decay function 
that is measured from the centroid of observation i’s (Lewandowska-Gwarda, 2018). 
Th e decay function utilized in this research is the fi xed kernel decay function.
Aft er obtaining the weighting matrix, then the general model of GWR is written as 
follows:
yi= α(ui,vj ) + ∑βk (ui,vj ) xik+ ε  (4)
 Th e estimated coeffi  cient is expressed by:
β = [XT W (ui, vi)X]−1XT W (ui, vi)Y
 GWR is useful to illustrate the spatial distribution of the fl ypaper eff ect while 
also accounting for spillover bias. Th e ArcGIS 10.2 soft ware is utilized to run GWS.
V. Results and Discussion
5.1. Size of Flypaper Eff ect in Indonesia
 Evidence of the fl ypaper eff ect is presented in Table 2. Th e reduced form 
in equation 1 is estimated using three models; ordinary least square (OLS), Spatial 
Lag Model (SLM), and Spatial Error Model (SEM). Results suggest that one-percent 
increase of grant stimulates 0.75 percent changes of total government expenditure. 
In the other hand, one-percent increase of total household income stimulates 0.11 
percent changes of government expenditure. Th e fl ypaper eff ect ( β1⁄β2 ) is around 
6.9 if Spatial Error Model was chosen. Comparing which model is effi  cient, all model 
present a similar result of standard errors. However in a goodness-to-fi t sense, the 
spatial error model is superior, with the largest log-likelihood value. OLS as expected, 
has estimation bias since the Breush-Pagan test and Jarque-Bera statistics show 
rejection of null hypothesis that homogeneity on residual and normally distributed 
error.  Moran’s I statistic varies from 0 to 1, showing the existence of spatial 
distribution of the independent variable. Null means spatial distribution is random 
and one means spatial distribution is systematic. Th e Moran’s I statistic for spatial 
correlation is greater than zero (0.46), indicating there is spatial interdependency of 
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total expenditure. The Moran’s I error in table 2 column (1) also not zero, indicating 
the presence of spatial heterogeneities. The Moran plot in Figure 2 shows a correlation 
of neighbor observation with initial observation.
Table 2. Estimates of ”flypaper effect”
Dep.Var Total Spending
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
(1) (2) (3)
Grant 0.59 *** 0.64 *** 0.75 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
HH Income 0.22 *** 0.19 *** 0.11 **
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
GDRP 0.27 *** 0.25 *** 0.21 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Tax Share -0.09 0.04 0.12
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
W. Total 
Spending
0.15 *** 0.08 *
(0.03) (0.05)
Lambda   0.34 ***
(0.05)
Province 
Dummy
Yes Yes Yes
Regional 
Dummy
Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.10 0.09 0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Log. Likeli-
hood
153.00 162.22 169.02
Jarque-Bera 1463.00
p-value 0.00
Breush-Pagan 
Test
357.90 376.43 762.42
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moran's I 0.29
p-value 0.00
LR Spatial 
Test
18.43 16.00
Flypaper Size 2.6 3.2 6.9
N 431.00 431.00 407.00
Notes: All variables are standardized into logarithmic form, treated in percapita form and deflated using year 2000 as 
constant year. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%
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 For the spatial lag model in Table 2, which is referred to in Equation 2, 
the coeffi  cient of W.Total Spending (σ) is positive and signifi cant, which indicates 
spatial auto-regressive matters. Aft er execution of the spatial auto-regressive 
model, the residuals are plotted in Figure 3.  Th e plot shows the correlation of 
spatial   lag error and observation error, which indicates a spatial dependency 
problem located in both autoregressive and omitted variable. Looking at the 
spatial error model, which is referred to in Equation 3, λ is signifi cant at 1% level, 
which indicates that spatial autocorrelation matters. Th erefore, utilizing spatial 
auto-regressive variables and treating spatial heterogeneity, we can obtain a better 
estimator. In summary, the spatial error model is superior to other employed 
estimators, where residual errors are homogeneous as presented in Figure 4. 
In addition, low p-value of Likelihood Ratio (LR) spatial test indicates strong 
relevance of spatial dependency on residuals (Anselin, Syabri and Kho, 2006).
 
 Th e stimulation eff ect of grants in Indonesia as estimated in this paper is 
0.75, in comparison with Italy;1.47 (Gennari and Messina, 2014), Argentina;0.66 
Figure 2. Moran’s I plot of lag-total expenditure
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(Acosta, 2010), The United States;0.43 (Gramlich et al., 1973), and India;1.64 (Lalvani, 
2002). The mentioned papers show that grants stimulate government spending more 
than an increase of income of median voters. A contrasting finding is reported by 
Worthington and Dollery (1999), where in Australian local government, grants are 
negatively related to spending. However they admitted mis-specification problems 
and the omitted problem bias in their research.
Table 3. Flypaper Effect by Expenditure Objective
Dep.Var Routine Spending Capital Spending
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grant 0.70 *** 0.73 *** 0.78 *** 0.33 *** 0.43 *** 0.53 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
HH Income 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 *** 0.40 *** 0.33 *** 0.28 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
GDRP per 
capita
0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.12 *** 0.26 *** 0.23 *** 0.18 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Tax Share -0.10 -0.02 0.16 -0.20 0.02 0.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19)
W. Routine 
Spending
0.10 *** 0.12 ***
(0.03) (0.05)
W. Capital 
Spending
0.27 *** 0.18 ***
(0.04) (0.06)
Lambda 0.43 *** 0.40 ***
(0.05) (0.05)
Province 
Dummy
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional 
Dummy
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.27 *** -0.24 *** -0.27 *** -0.46 *** -0.33 *** -0.35 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10)
Log. Likeli-
hood
262.30 266.88 292.01 128.21 152.72 167.28
Jarque-Bera 778.70 280.25
p-value 0.00 0.00
Breush-Pagan 
Test
436.30 427.12 714.88 213.15 221.28 370.00
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moran's I 0.31  0.32
p-value 0.00
LR Spatial Test 9.15 62.87 49.01 45.47
N 431.00 431.00 407.00 418.00 418.00 418.00
Flypaper 4.34 5.02 7.41 0.83 1.31 1.91
 
Notes: All variables are standardized into logarithmic form, treated in percapita form and deflated using year 2000 as 
constant year. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%.
Tengku Munawar Chalil
112
Jurnal Perencanaan Pembangunan
The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning
Vol II No. 2 - Sep 2018
 In addition, Table 3 reports the size of flypaper when total spending is decom-
posed into capital spending and routine spending. Strumpf (1998) notes that the fly-
paper effect can be observed when the elasticity of grant on overhead spending great-
er than the elasticity of income. The flypaper effect still exist in overhead spending, 
but the size is not as large as that of total grants (Table  2). Interestingly, flypaper effect 
size is smaller in capital spending. It should be noted that the elasticity of grant to 
capital spending is relatively smaller than the elasticity of grant to overhead spending. 
 One explanation in this case is fiscal illusion. This theory elucidates 
that government deceives the median voters by increase the public budget, but 
in most cases spend the budget according to their preference, which weights 
on routine spending i.e., paying salaries, meetings, official business trips, and 
others, compared to capital spending i.e., increasing assets, building infra-
structure, and investing in physical treasury. The results provide empirical ev-
idence where grants stimulate routine spending more than physical spending. 
 Table 4 presents the detail regression on table 3, particularly when the 
total grant is disaggregated into equalization grants (lump-sum grants), specif-
ic allocation grants, and revenue sharing. The table only presents estimation us-
ing spatial error model. The size of elasticity of income to total grant becomes 
not significant. The coefficients of lump sum grants and revenue sharing are sig-
nificantly massive to boost the total expenditure. The lump sum grants effect be-
comes more substantial for routine expenditure. In contrast, the specific alloca-
tion grants, which usually marked to physical spending, is significant to capital 
expenditure than the lump sum grants. The income of voters also has significant 
effect to capital spending, which was the spending that voters value the most. 
 As predicted by Bradford and Oates (1971), the effect of a lump-sum grant is 
largest on stimulating routine spending where the lump sum grants shift the income 
of the disburse parties. In contrast with a specific allocation grant (matching grant), 
it has a small effect on routine spending but large to capital spending. The match-
ing grants creates a substitution effect, which lower the price of public goods than 
private goods. As a consequence, increasing the supply of public service. Revenue 
sharing has a moderate effect but the impact direction is similar to the lump-sum 
grant. In Indonesia, the nature of revenue sharing is a mixed with lump sum grants 
and matching grants. For example, revenue shares from natural resources such as 
mineral has effect as the lump sum grants but revenue shares from land and income 
tax should has effect as the matching grants. Further investigation in this issue should 
be taken as note in the future research.  
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Table 4.Flypaper Effect by Expenditure Objective and nature of grants 
Dep. Var Total Expenditure Routine Expenditure Capital Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Equalization Grants 0.46 *** 0.62 *** 0.12 ***
0.04 0.05 0.04
Specific Allocation Grants 0.08 ** 0.09 *** 0.24 ***
0.03 0.04 0.03
Revenue Sharing 0.43 *** 0.20 *** 0.43 ***
0.02 0.02 0.02
HH Income 0.01 0.04 0.15 ***
0.03 0.03 0.03
GDRP per capita -0.01 0.04 0.00
0.02 0.03 0.02
Tax Share 0.27 *** 0.18 0.37 ***
0.11 0.13 0.11
W.Total Expenditure -0.02
0.03
W.Routine Expenditure -0.09 ***
0.04
W.Capital Expenditure 0.07 **
0.04
Lambda 0.31 0.33 *** 0.28 ***
0.07 0.05 0.05
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.83 *** 0.10 *** 0.42 ***
0.07 0.08 0.07
Log. Likelihood 390.44 343.31 382.44
LR Spatial Test 36.03 36.14 24.92
N 407.00 404.00 404.00
Notes: Spatial Error Model is utilized. All variables are standardized into logarithmic form, treated in percapita form 
and deflated using year 2000 as constant year. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, 
**at 5% and * at 10%.
 Figure 5 presents the distribution of the flypaper effect using GWR. The 
modified version of equation 1 is used as the basic econometric model. GWR produces 
a local estimated coefficient for each observation. The size of the flypaper effect on 
municipal i is expressed as β1(ui, uj)/β2(ui, uj), which are plotted on Figure 5. The 
darker color indicates the larger size of the flypaper effect. As illustrated, distribution 
of the flypaper effect is almost similar with the distribution of dependency of local 
government on intergovernmental grants..The flypaper effect size in the southern 
part of Indonesia, especially Java island, is relatively small compared with the 
other islands. Indonesian economic activity is concentrated in Java island, which 
indicates a high household income. The grant effect is not as large as other parts of 
Indonesia, for example southern Sumatra, Papua, Sulawesi, and western Kalimantan.
Tengku Munawar Chalil
114
Jurnal Perencanaan Pembangunan
The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning
Vol II No. 2 - Sep 2018
5.2. Pre- and Post- implementation of a Balance Decentralization
 Signifi cant changes of decentralization policy aft er year 2004, when the 
central government rebalanced the power by strengthening the role of sub-national 
government to coordinate development in the local regions and reformulating 
the calculation of grants.In Table 5, part A, the fl ypaper eff ect is measured during 
pre-2004 period and post-2004 period. Here, the spatial error model is utilized. 
Th e stimulation eff ects of grants increases by 0.05 points  aft er rebalancing 
decentralization. Th e stimulation eff ects also excalate for both in capital and routine 
spending. Th e plausible explanation behind this result is that the grant is signifi cantly 
boosted post-2004, which stimulates the self-interest local government’s boost in 
overhead spending.
Figure 5. Spatial Distribution of Flypaper Eff ect using GWS
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Table 5. Flypaper Effect by Dynamic of Decentralization 
Dep.Var Total Spend Routine Spend Capital Spend
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Part A:
Grant 0.85 *** 0.90 *** 0.43 *** 0.56 *** 1.20 *** 1.24 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10)
HH Income 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.14 *** 0.12 *** -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
W.Y 0.04 ** 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08 *** -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Lambda 0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.21 *** 0.39 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AIC -1164 -1430 -698 -1158 203 -486
Log Likeli-
hood
596 729 363 593 -378 257.
06
Flypaper 24.14  25.42 3.06 4.67
Part B:
Equalization 
Grant
0.67 *** 0.28 *** 0.71 *** 0.35 *** 0.55 *** 0.28 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08)
Specific Allo-
cation Grant
0.03 *** 0.23 *** 0.00 0.07 *** 0.06 0.35 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Revenue 
Sharing
0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.00 0.03 *** 0.12 *** 0.16 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
HH Income 0.05 * 0.13 *** 0.03 0.15 *** 0.24 *** 0.13 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04)
W.Y 0.12 *** 0.06 * 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.20 *** 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Lambda 0.38 *** 0.41 *** 0.24 *** 0.39 *** 0.19 *** 0.34 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AIC -873 -895 -786 -994 -256 -349
Log Likeli-
hood
452.63 463.36 409.36 512.89 144.13 190.64
Notes: Spatial Error Model is utilized. All variables are standardized into logarithmic form, treated in percapita 
form and deflated using year 2000 as constant year. Control variables are PeCapita GDRP, Tax share, provincial and 
regional dummies. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%.
 However, the issue of multi-collinearity needs to be addressed, since there 
should be a possible correlation between grant and household income, directly or 
indirectly. As seen in the illustration, several portions of grant transferred is used 
by local government to be spent on households i.e. tax rebates, household grants, 
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or family incentives, and in this case a higher grant stimulates higher income.
 Table 5, part B presents the effect of disaggregated grants to government 
expenditure. The effect of household income on government expenditure is 
substantially greater after 2004 while the effect of specified intergovernmental 
grants is lower after 2004. The equalization grant effect is significantly lowered 
by 0.39 points for total spending even though the amount is greater after 2004. 
The change of equalization grant with the inclusion of local government basic 
allocation (local’s salary and others) limits the local bureaucrats to freely spending 
the equalization grant. Before 2004, local governments could freely spend the 
equalization grant for example not only paying salaries but also allowances or 
bonuses to their employees. After the change, salaries and allowances were locked by 
central government, which resulted in the equalization grant only financing public 
service authorities. This reasoning also explains why the effect of equalization grant 
decreases on overhead spending after 2004. The effect of the specific allocation grant 
changes a lot after 2004 where the central government are increasing the amount 
of matching grants and proliferation of matching grants target. The recent policy 
also target the fulfilment of Minimum Standard of Service (MSS) by utilizing 
funding from specific allocation grants. Study by Roudo and Chalil (2016) shows 
the significant impact of the specific allocation grants for achieving national 
target. The effect of revenue sharing remains similar to the equalization grant.
 Using GWR, the changes of size and spatial distribution of the flypaper 
effect is checked. Figure 6 shows flypaper distribution before 2004. The size of 
the flypaper effect is larger in eastern parts of Indonesia and the southern parts 
of Sumatra island. Sulawesi and the western part of Kalimantan have a smaller 
size of flypaper effect compared to other parts of Indonesia. Figure 7 shows the 
changes after 2004. The distribution is similar to that in Figure 5. Central Maluku 
island has the highest magnitude of the flypaper effect with a value of 11.7 and the 
lowest is Surabaya city with a value of 0.11. After decentralization, the eastern part 
of Kalimantan became dependent on grants where the size of the flypaper effect 
became greater after 2004. Java island, which acts as the centre of development, 
experienced a shrinking in the size of the flypaper effect after the policy changes.
VI. Concluding Remark
 After almost five decades of study on the effect of intergovernmental grants, 
the flypaper effect remains unavoidable when a lump-sum transfer granted to local 
bureaucrats. The grant from government stays in the government while citizens’ 
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income remains with the citizens.
 This paper explores the flypaper effect in Indonesia using the spatial ap- 
proach. The spatial approach is offered in this paper due to the fact that ignoring 
the issues of spillover of public expenditure, the mobility of the median voters, and 
inter-regional relationships would create bias when estimating size of flypaper effect. 
In short, spatial dependency is important in estimating the flypaper effect. This 
study employs various techniques and experiments controlling the spatial effect on 
measuring the size of the flypaper effect, which has a value of 6.9, using Indonesian 
data.
 Further, this paper presents the natural effect of grant by its type. It 
shows evidence on intergovernmental grants theory (See: Bradford and Oates, 
1971; Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1978; and Romer and Rosenthal, 
1980) where the impact of a lump-sum grant and matching grant are different, 
whether on aggregate spending, overhead spending or capital spending.
 This paper also offers an analysis of the dynamics of the flypaper effect due to 
the decentralization process, particularly in the case of Indonesia, where the size of 
the flypaper effect became smaller. Finally, spatial distribution of the flypaper effect 
in Indonesia is presented that emphasizes spatial matter for creating an asymmetric 
flypaper effect.
 However, one thing that needs to be noted is that household income is not 
independent from grants, which suggests that endogeneity needs to be carefully 
addressed. Instrumental analysis should be useful but finding a perfect instrument to 
control the endogeneity is an enormous challenge for future research. Furthermore, 
household income is not a perfect variable to represent the income of median 
voters, which criticizes conventional reduced form estimation of flypaper effect.
 For Indonesian policymaking, several policy issues need to be addressed. 
The first is rethinking the equalization grant design. The equalization grant 
is indeed necessary as mandated in decentralization but it stimulates non-
important overhead spending rather than the capital spending necessary for 
citizens. The government homework must be to find how to make citizens 
aware of grants and to monitor how well the bureaucrats use them. Second, the 
spatial distribution of flypaper is not equal across regions, showing which local 
governments rely on grants and which government are not dependent on grants. 
By mapping the spatial distribution, central government can address which areas 
need to be evaluated in terms of grant and expenditure management. Finally, 
the decentralization process in Indonesia must be assessed, while questioning 
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whether it has hit a development milestone and is creating better public services.
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